I have always been very interested in military logistics especially during the second half of the 19th century when army commanders began to face the almost insuperable problems created by the simultaneous use of railways and horse drawn wagons. The huge increase in the size of armies during this period, encouraged by the availability of railways to both move and supply these armies at the strategic level, created enormous problems for generals because the tactical transport system at this time still remained the horse drawn wagon. Although these difficulties probably reached a peak in the early days of WW1 during the German advance into France and Belgium, they had been building ever since railways first came into substantial military use during the US civil war.
About 300 Union supply wagons at Brandy Station, just one supply column.
Interestingly the armies of Imperial France, wholly dependant on the horse drawn wagon, still managed to reach Moscow in 1812, further than the Wehrmacht in 1941, despite that army's considerable railway and motor vehicle resources. I am very well aware of the relative size of the forces involved and the issues the Germans faced in Russia in 1941/2 in supplying their forces adequately and that recourse was made to horse drawn transport to a very substantial degree. Nevertheless the Germans did possess a huge number of motor vehicles and enjoyed an enormous railway supply capacity up to the Polish frontier, far greater in fact than was actually needed. Napoleon however had nothing other than horse drawn wagons to bring supplies from his bases in central Germany. Despite the ultimate failure of the French invasion and the desperate nature of the retreat, the simple fact that they did get as far as Moscow at all surely says something about the inherent strength of a horse based logistic system.
Another example from this period is that of Mercer's horse artillery battery at Waterloo. After his heavy action at Quatre-Bras the day before, Mercer's battery was out of ammunition. He was advised that a resupply could be found on the road to Brussels. He sent a wagon train overnight to search for this ammunition. They were fortunate enough to find the ammunition, and some most welcome food, and returned next morning not long before the battle commenced. I am left to speculate on the outcome of the battle if that resupply had not taken place. Without ammunition, Mercer's battery would not have been able to participate and the French cavalry charges, which they played a large role in defeating, might have been successful. Could Napoleon have thus won the battle before the Prussians appeared later in the day?
During the US civil war the battle of Gettysburg gives a wonderful illustration of the capabilities of the horse drawn wagon . One of General Lee 's objectives for the invasion of Pennsylvania, was to "requisition" as much material and supplies as possible. During the retreat from Gettysburg Lee had some 3000 wagon loads of "requisitioned" supplies and materials preceding his withdrawing combat forces. In fact the quantities captured enabled Lee to supply his Army of Virginia for the best part of another year. This poses the question as to whether the war could have ended a year earlier if the Union cavalry had been more focused on recapturing or destroying these supplies during the retreat.
This battle also raises another example of the issues faced by commanders in the horse based supply era. Prior to Pickett's charge, Lee had commanded his artillery to bombard the Union position. Unfortunately the supplies of artillery ammunition immediately available provided for a somewhat limited barrage. The reserve ammunition was still many miles to the rear, basically due to faulty logistical management. Consequently Pickett's charge took place after far less damage had been inflicted on the Union forces than Lee planned. The charge of course failed, would it have failed if the reserve ammunition had been readily available, now that is a question.
There are other examples of logistical issues dramatically impacting military operations in these years. No one can read the history of the Zulu war without noting the amount of time, energy and resource that Lord Chelmsford devoted to securing enough transport to supply the British advance into Zululand. As a result the British army had plenty of supplies, especially ammunition, readily to hand. Nevertheless the battle of Isandhlwana was lost for two reasons. Firstly the tactical error of deploying the British infantry companies too far in advance of the camp, up to 1000 yards in some cases, thereby making resupply of ammunition virtually impossible. Secondly the logistical failure whereby British army supply practise at the time only permitted the opening of one ammunition box at a time, an error that Chelmsford subsequently corrected during the battle of Ulundi when boxes of ammunition were opened throughout the British positions before the action even started.
These logistical matters fascinate me and lead me to conclude that the capabilities of a horse drawn supply system were far better than is commonly supposed provided the supplies being moved were restricted to rations and basic ammunition loads etc. Of course during this period many campaigns were carried out using only the ammunition supplies actually carried with the armies. Resupply from base other than for rations or artillery ammunition did not regularly arise before WW1. Even then the railways ensured vast quantities of supplies could be brought forward and problems only arose if armies advanced so fast that the horse drawn transport could not keep up in a timely fashion. For example, every offensive on the Eastern front in WW1, by either side, eventually fizzled out, not because of enemy resistance but through lack of supplies.
As is no doubt clear to the reader of this blog, to ensure they do not run short of supplies or essential supporting resources, my armies have a very substantial logistical capability. Certainly far more than other modellers of this era may think appropriate given that supply units are not glamorous compared to cavalry or even infantry.
Another example from this period is that of Mercer's horse artillery battery at Waterloo. After his heavy action at Quatre-Bras the day before, Mercer's battery was out of ammunition. He was advised that a resupply could be found on the road to Brussels. He sent a wagon train overnight to search for this ammunition. They were fortunate enough to find the ammunition, and some most welcome food, and returned next morning not long before the battle commenced. I am left to speculate on the outcome of the battle if that resupply had not taken place. Without ammunition, Mercer's battery would not have been able to participate and the French cavalry charges, which they played a large role in defeating, might have been successful. Could Napoleon have thus won the battle before the Prussians appeared later in the day?
During the US civil war the battle of Gettysburg gives a wonderful illustration of the capabilities of the horse drawn wagon . One of General Lee 's objectives for the invasion of Pennsylvania, was to "requisition" as much material and supplies as possible. During the retreat from Gettysburg Lee had some 3000 wagon loads of "requisitioned" supplies and materials preceding his withdrawing combat forces. In fact the quantities captured enabled Lee to supply his Army of Virginia for the best part of another year. This poses the question as to whether the war could have ended a year earlier if the Union cavalry had been more focused on recapturing or destroying these supplies during the retreat.
This battle also raises another example of the issues faced by commanders in the horse based supply era. Prior to Pickett's charge, Lee had commanded his artillery to bombard the Union position. Unfortunately the supplies of artillery ammunition immediately available provided for a somewhat limited barrage. The reserve ammunition was still many miles to the rear, basically due to faulty logistical management. Consequently Pickett's charge took place after far less damage had been inflicted on the Union forces than Lee planned. The charge of course failed, would it have failed if the reserve ammunition had been readily available, now that is a question.
There are other examples of logistical issues dramatically impacting military operations in these years. No one can read the history of the Zulu war without noting the amount of time, energy and resource that Lord Chelmsford devoted to securing enough transport to supply the British advance into Zululand. As a result the British army had plenty of supplies, especially ammunition, readily to hand. Nevertheless the battle of Isandhlwana was lost for two reasons. Firstly the tactical error of deploying the British infantry companies too far in advance of the camp, up to 1000 yards in some cases, thereby making resupply of ammunition virtually impossible. Secondly the logistical failure whereby British army supply practise at the time only permitted the opening of one ammunition box at a time, an error that Chelmsford subsequently corrected during the battle of Ulundi when boxes of ammunition were opened throughout the British positions before the action even started.
These logistical matters fascinate me and lead me to conclude that the capabilities of a horse drawn supply system were far better than is commonly supposed provided the supplies being moved were restricted to rations and basic ammunition loads etc. Of course during this period many campaigns were carried out using only the ammunition supplies actually carried with the armies. Resupply from base other than for rations or artillery ammunition did not regularly arise before WW1. Even then the railways ensured vast quantities of supplies could be brought forward and problems only arose if armies advanced so fast that the horse drawn transport could not keep up in a timely fashion. For example, every offensive on the Eastern front in WW1, by either side, eventually fizzled out, not because of enemy resistance but through lack of supplies.
As is no doubt clear to the reader of this blog, to ensure they do not run short of supplies or essential supporting resources, my armies have a very substantial logistical capability. Certainly far more than other modellers of this era may think appropriate given that supply units are not glamorous compared to cavalry or even infantry.
A Woodscrew Miniature Army Quartermaster battalion, just one of 24 such units, drawn up waiting for the order to advance.
With that in mind I wonder how much notice wargamers take of logistical matters, including resupply from base, when fighting 19th century battles, not much would be my guess. In fact I believe that most wargamers do not pay much attention to whether their troops have sufficient ammunition or food to actually fight a battle or especially a campaign. Additionally, how many wargamers consider such vital logistical matters such as remounts or forge wagons to shoe cavalry or even fodder to feed horses. Given the examples listed above are wargaming rules realistic in respect of logistics when it is commonly understood that warfare is 90% logistics and 10% tactics ??
