I am not sure why I choose to re-read this particular book from my library, however it is very interesting. As you might expect of any book about Haig it attempts to analyse the man to determine if he was a good general or a "donkey leading lions". This author is clearly of the former persuasion.
As ever the truth is somewhere in the middle. Haig was clearly as good a general as any in the British Army at the time and a good deal better than many. The author tries to show that Haig did his best by using his diaries and letters to show that he was thoughtful and caring of the soldiers lives. His strategies were clearly thought through and represented the best military thinking available within the training and experience of the era. Generals on both sides were faced with totally new military challenges. Although it can be said that the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 offered a good insight into the conditions that would apply to conflict early in the century, the fact is that it would have taken an exceptionally foresighted general to not only recognise what was going to happen but to create a better strategy than those actually used by Haig and his generals.
The book also clearly illustrates the impact of politicians, especially Lloyd George, on the conduct of the war. There can be no doubt that he was responsible indirectly for many British casualties because of his interference in military matters. That he thought he had a better understanding of military matters than his generals is without doubt. Unfortunately Haig was not equipped intellectually to handle a politician of Lloyd Georges abilities, neither was Robertson for that matter.
A good book that shows Haig , I think, did his best. Whether that was good enough is another matter. I have always thought that the biggest loss to the British Army in 1914 was the death of Greirson. If he had lived I believe he would have become GOC of the BEF and it is fascinating to speculate on how he would have commanded. I wish there was a book about that man as from what I have read, he was very gifted.
In my view the final year of the American Civil War ought to have told the European generals something. Or the American, come to that. Considering their brief entree into the First World War, the Americans took heavy losses in the battles they fought, and that was against an enemy already on its last legs.
ReplyDeleteThe invention of the tank was clever, and to his credit, Haig endorsed them. But to his discredit, he f used them prematurely in unsuitable terrain, and before they had a chance to shakedown into proper efficiency in the actual theatre or war. But really, the tank was (and remains) a 'brute force' weapon. The Germans came within an ace of winning the ground war early in 1918 using far more subtle means, much of which was learned from the Russians. Considering they lacked the tank arm, that was quite an achievement.
In my view, Haig was a donkey: unimaginative, stolid, determined. If you haven't read them. I'd recommend Norman Dixon 'On the Psychology of Military Incompetence' and John Laffin 'British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One'. The Dixon book is in three parts: 1 - an account of some disastrous campaigns incompetently led; 2 - military psychology - Freudian, pretty much, and pretty dated after 40-odd years; and 3. Some comparisons and contrasts.
The Laffin (an Australian) is pretty much a hatchet job, but bally entertaining and (I find) persuasive. I believe there is etched into the Australian psyche a certain Anglophobia that World War One did much to deepen.
You might also be interested in Paul Fussell 'The Great War and Modern Memory' - an exploration of the literature, contemporaneous and looking back, upon World war One. Finally, a fine fictional portrayal of a British WW1 commander C.S. Forester 'The General'.
Cheers,
Ion
Thanks for your interesting views. I do agree there was plenty of pre war evidence that should have informed British military thinking after 1914. I think the problem was less about the individual generals, like Haig, than the entrenched thought processes that British military training created in the generals during their formative years in the late 1800's. The Boar war should have been a wake up call in tactical thinking as it was in organisation and weaponry. I am familiar with the Laffin book, I tend to agree that is built on a strong dislike of the British and therefore to be taken with a pinch of salt. I was not aware of the C.S. Forrester book so will have a look at it, it sounds interesting. Thanks for the imput.
ReplyDeleteContinuing on the World War One thing, I have five of the six-volume set of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's history of the British part of the Western Front (I'm missing the sixth and last, the Allied counter-offensive from August 1918). It makes for interesting reading, Anglo-centric to the point of chauvinism.
ReplyDeleteI also have a very fine account of the last year of the war by John Toland: 'No Man's Land'.
The thing about the Laffin book is that he does refer frequently to what participants in the war wrote about it. That is also what makes the Paul Fussel book so interesting. Personally, I find it hard to retain any respect for the 'leadership' of men who remained 30 or 60 miles behind the front line, never visited it and never visited the men up at the sharp end.
Dwight Eisenhower wasn't one of you 'lead from the front guys', but he made regular visits to forward formations. He allowed that his presence was a morale booster on the grounds that if he was there, the enemy can't be very close!
Cheers,
Ion
Hi. I think your last point very telling. If IKE was there the enemy was not !!!! I think that is why Haig and others didn't visit the immediate front, the enemy was there !!!! The death toll among British generals was actually quite high, almost all from shell fire. That is not an excuse rather than a reason. Haig thought himself indispensable, that's why he never resigned despite the pressure to do so from Lloyd George. Putting himself at risk by visiting the front was a manifestation of the same attitude. Lets face it, Haig was a flawed man, like most of us, and an imperfect general. The question is, who could or should have replaced him. Lloyd George certainly could not think of a suitable alternative. I still think he was the best of a bad bunch although I would always agree that is a poor reflection on British generals of the time sadly.
ReplyDelete