IMAGI-NATIONS. PART 45

 THE SECOND SINO-UNION WAR.

At dawn on 11th June 1889 the opening salvos from UNION artillery started to fall on advancing Chinese troops.  Over the course of the following months the UNION and Chinese armies fought 7 substantial battles. Losses on both sides were severe but the UNION army just emerged victorious from each conflict. Eventually, in August, after a very closely fought battle which Chinese forces came very close to winning, the UNION 10th Reserve Army emerged very battered but victorious and the Chinese armies began the long retreat north. The UNION army was too seriously damaged to initiate a pursuit and was only able to send a small cavalry force to monitor the Chinese retreat.  

For a comprehensive account of these battles and the whole campaign, please refer to the ARCHDUKE PICCOLO blog under the Woodscrew Army Campaign label which gives a superb series of articles which are highly recommended.

Shortly after the cessation of hostilities the UNION 5th army crossed the border  into China to re-establish UNION control of the disputed territories and 10th Reserve army was withdrawn to base. Some two months later 10th Reserve Army was deactivated with the soldiers discharged and vehicles and equipment returned to strategic stores at Rock Island Arsenal. During that two month period, on instruction from the UNION high command,  General Sherman, commander of 1st Union army, with his senior staff, carried out a full review into what had been a fairly disastrous campaign for the UNION and presented a report.

Sherman's report focused on three major points. First; why did 10th army's cavalry perform so poorly, second; why did UNION artillery prove comparatively ineffective given it's vast superiority to the Chinese artillery and third; how effective was the leadership of Jackson, the general commanding 10th army. 

The conclusions were that Jackson, who had been recalled from retirement, had a strong belief that attack was the best form of defense. This, despite his instructions to conserve his forces while delaying the Chinese advance pending reinforcements, caused him to launch some assaults on the Chinese when circumstances were not favorable resulting in unnecessary UNION casualties. It was noted however, that Jackson was popular among his troops and he had been surrounded by a group of very talented brigade commanders who had been instrumental in securing his victories against the far more numerous Chinese forces.

As to the failures of 10th army's cavalry and artillery, the report concluded that both arms suffered from a loss of skills as a result of the manpower being reservists. 10th army was comprised of reservists in their 3rd to 5th years of being on the reserve and had only been expected to undertake garrison type duties. Those in the 1st and 2nd years of reserve service were used as replacements for the regular armies. Consequently the men in 10th army were often unfit and seriously out of practice. While this had some effect on the infantry and other arms resulting in a degree of poor performance, in the cavalry and artillery arms,  this loss of skill had a severe impact on combat effectiveness.

The recommendations in the report, which were fully accepted by the UNION army high command, were; one; that command of 10th reserve army would in future only be entrusted to a serving officer, two; that no action be taken against Jackson for reasons of UNION moral, and he had of course been successful eventually, 3; that the reserve army be formed in future from soldiers from the first and second years of reserve service and 4; that soldiers in the 3rd to 5th years of reserve service be used to reinforce the regular armies but in all cases only after a period of retraining. In order to provide time for that retraining, all reserves would need to be activated immediately on outbreak of hostilities rather than after casualties had been incurred which had been the practice to date.

The report also noted that the Chinese army had performed far more effectively and been better armed to some extent than had been expected and indicated that any historic complacency by the UNION regarding the combat power of the Chinese had been a grave error. The report finally recommended that the UNION high command urgently consider how to combat the threat to the UNION that the Chinese army now posed. In response to that particular issue, a study group was formed by Sherman to determine how the UNION could launch a campaign against China to destroy, for the foreseeable future, China's ability to threaten the UNION.

Sherman's study group noted that, apart from defeating the Chinese army, to effectively destroy China's ability to make war on the UNION, the Chinese centres of arms manufacturing in Peking and Shanghai would need to be destroyed. As these cities were about 6000 miles from the border with the UNION it was considered impractical for the UNION to invade China. Even if the Chinese railway network could be captured with only moderate damage, to guard a supply line of 6000 miles would consume more troops than the UNION army possessed leaving no troops to actually fight the Chinese army. In addition it was considered impractical to actually subdue and occupy a country the size of China.

After lengthy and tortuous debate, finally in early spring of 1890 a radical proposition was put forward. Using the port of Miami as a base, it was proposed to ship the UNION army to Bombay in India and launch an invasion into China from there, it being only 1000 miles from the Indian border to Peking and even less to Shanghai.