The wonderful book was found, very cheaply priced, on an antiques stall at a Christmas fair last December. It is a first edition from 1855 in excellent condition and is now the oldest book in my library. The war in question is the Crimea War. Many will know that this war was the first to be covered in depth by a newspaper journalist namely William Russell of the Times. His reports alerted the public in England to the appalling conditions of the British forces in the Crimea and prompted the adventures of Florence Nightingale as well as a public clamor for better Government support for the Army. This book is a compilation of all Russell's letters to the Times from the embarkation of the British forces in March 1854 until the death of the commander in chief, Lord Raglan, in June 1855. Part two of the book covers the subsequent period until the departure from the Crimea of the last British troops in 1856. Following my discovery of the first edition, I searched online for part two and found it as a reprint, there being no sign of an original copy, this of course I have purchased.
It is clear from Russell's letters, which form this book, that he did not have any military education however he was very observant and clear minded and quickly realised that the British Army authorities had no idea of logistics. On only page 6 he made his first criticism of the arrangements for feeding the troops as they arrived in Malta on their journey to The Crimea. In fact no arrangements had been made with the result that thousands of troops landed only to find that the island's resources were totally insufficient to feed so many. The same situation prevailed on arrival in Crimea in that although ship loads of supplies had by then caught up, there were no means to move the supplies from the ships up to the troops. Additionally Russell also criticised the authorities for the dreadful lack of care for the wounded and sick. These failings continued for several months until public pressure in England forced the authorities to act.
Russell's descriptions of the fighting and early battles are typical of a non military man observing from a distance. If you want detailed reports of the fighting you should look elsewhere however his writings on the activities in the rear areas are exceedingly good and give a real understanding of the conditions under which the troops lived , fought and died. He also demonstrates a strong appreciation of strategy and bemoans the lack of strategic insight by the Generals as evidenced not least by The Charge of the Light Brigade.
The book proves beyond doubt that both the Army command and the War Office had no grasp of logistics, the idea seemingly being that just loading large quantities of supplies on ships and dispatching them to the Crimea was all that was needed. No thought was given to providing labour to unload ships, storage facilities or vehicles/horses to transport the supplies to the troops nor even to providing officers skilled in such activities. The British Army of 1854 was wholly focused on smart uniforms, shiny cavalry horses and glory rather than the provision during a campaign of accommodation for man and horse or food for either. One can only assume that the logistical knowledge that must have existed in the army from the Napoleonic wars had been forgotten or perhaps perhaps more likely the study of logistics was not seen as a glamorous enough calling for officers of that time. What ever the reason, as usual, it was the soldiers who paid the price for the authorities failure to address logistics correctly.
Overall an excellent book and a great addition to my library, I am looking forward to reading part 2.
It is clear from Russell's letters, which form this book, that he did not have any military education however he was very observant and clear minded and quickly realised that the British Army authorities had no idea of logistics. On only page 6 he made his first criticism of the arrangements for feeding the troops as they arrived in Malta on their journey to The Crimea. In fact no arrangements had been made with the result that thousands of troops landed only to find that the island's resources were totally insufficient to feed so many. The same situation prevailed on arrival in Crimea in that although ship loads of supplies had by then caught up, there were no means to move the supplies from the ships up to the troops. Additionally Russell also criticised the authorities for the dreadful lack of care for the wounded and sick. These failings continued for several months until public pressure in England forced the authorities to act.
Russell's descriptions of the fighting and early battles are typical of a non military man observing from a distance. If you want detailed reports of the fighting you should look elsewhere however his writings on the activities in the rear areas are exceedingly good and give a real understanding of the conditions under which the troops lived , fought and died. He also demonstrates a strong appreciation of strategy and bemoans the lack of strategic insight by the Generals as evidenced not least by The Charge of the Light Brigade.
The book proves beyond doubt that both the Army command and the War Office had no grasp of logistics, the idea seemingly being that just loading large quantities of supplies on ships and dispatching them to the Crimea was all that was needed. No thought was given to providing labour to unload ships, storage facilities or vehicles/horses to transport the supplies to the troops nor even to providing officers skilled in such activities. The British Army of 1854 was wholly focused on smart uniforms, shiny cavalry horses and glory rather than the provision during a campaign of accommodation for man and horse or food for either. One can only assume that the logistical knowledge that must have existed in the army from the Napoleonic wars had been forgotten or perhaps perhaps more likely the study of logistics was not seen as a glamorous enough calling for officers of that time. What ever the reason, as usual, it was the soldiers who paid the price for the authorities failure to address logistics correctly.
Overall an excellent book and a great addition to my library, I am looking forward to reading part 2.
I have had Russell's book for several years now and it is a great read. However, whilst his criticisms of the Army establishment are largely correct, they are also too simplistic. For instance much of the supply confusion at Balaklava arose from the fact that Raglan and his staff picked a poor location (have a look at how narrow the harbour entrance is on Google Earth and you will see what I mean) and then (especially with the onset of the Crimean winter)there was no proper maens of getting proper supplies away from the harbour and up to the trenches until a proper roadway and a tramway was built the following year. It is worth reading some of the modern histories that are now available to get a different perspective
ReplyDeleteYes of course you are right Ian. That said the failures of the Army included choosing the wrong landing site and in not making adequate arrangements for all aspects of logistics. In that sense Russell's criticisms may be simplistic but they are still valid.
ReplyDelete